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Academic Vocation: What the Lutheran University has to Offer 
Wendy Mccredie 
The tension between bonds of particular love and a love which is open to every neighbor ... cannot be overcome by any 
theory, however intricate. Our thinking can only warn against certain mistakes, certain wrong turnings which we might take. 
But this central problem of the Christian life must be lived, not just thought. -Gilbert Meilaender 
A Methodological Prologue 
Faculty, students, and staff at the colleges, universities, 
and seminaries of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in 
America (ELCA) live and work in the tension Gilbert 
Meilaender describes above. However, in spite of 
numerous attempts, those of us who care about the 
church-relatedness of our universities have not 
adequately articulated this tension to our students, to our 
constituencies, or even among ourselves. In fact, central 
claims in the Lutheran tradition forestall such an 
adequate articulation while simultaneously requiring its 
continued pursuit. Each of us who attempts such an 
articulation will do so from disciplinary and faith 
perspectives that will both neglect and supplement 
others' points. None of our articulations can stand alone, 
yet each of them coheres around a central dialogical 1
tension between the bonds of faith, on the one hand, and 
the openness and love faith inspires for others and for 
God's created world, on the other hand. What follows is 
one more attempt to articulate productively this dialogical 
tension and to suggest how it can promote practical and 
useful understandings of the vocation of the ELCA­
related colleges and universities. 
Because profession is intimately grounded confession, 
this essay begins with an outline of the determining 
features of my faith as it influences my thoughts. The 
next section moves away from personal confession to the 
communal concern about the future of the church-related 
college, and the last sections represent various dialogical 
engagements with that concern in a specifically Lutheran 
context. What I write here, I write as a practicing 
Lutheran and a trained literary scholar. Until very 
recently, I taught at a university with "Lutheran" in its 
name; I now work at the churchwide offices of the 
ELCA. From one perspective, therefore, I write from a 
position of insider privilege. From another perspective, 
my lack of formal theological training may raise 
questions about my authority. In any case, for a Lutheran 
who believes the church is semper reformanda and who 
is one among the "priesthood of all believers," any 
privilege associated with teaching at a Lutheran 
university simultaneously constitutes a responsibility. 
My privileged position requires a constant interrogation 
of both my faith and the institutions that claim to nurture 
it. I am called to investigate both confessional and 
professional claims. 
Being a Christian in the Lutheran tradition means that I 
have faith in Christ, in God's scandalous self­
revelation-a self-revelation that transgresses and 
suspends God's own law. Christ, God Incarnate, 
transgresses the law that separated the divine from the 
human. Jesus Christ thus embodies paradox and invites 
dialogue between God and human. This faith in God's 
scandalous self-revelation in Christ motivates an attitude 
of service to that good God and love for my neighbor. 
My service is motivated by faith, and God's grace 
enables its efficacy. 
From that attitude of service motivated by faith, reason 
helps determine what is faithful, what I might best do, 
here and now. This requirement or call to act is as 
universal as the gracious love to which it is a response. 
Always, however, I attempt to act with an attitude of 
humility, because I might be wrong. In fact, it is not only 
reason that discerns appropriate action; it is God's grace 
that allows for the possibility that I might be right in that 
discernment. 
The recognition of the limitations of and on human 
reason may be the most difficult hurdle for scholars to 
overcome. To be called to employ human reason and to 
act in accordance with that reason, while simultaneously 
understanding that reason errs, seems quite silly, even 
foolish. If one uses the best tools, intellectual or 
otherwise, to solve a problem, it is quite difficult to act on 
that solution in good faith, while at the same time 
recognizing that those best tools might not be adequate to 
the project. Indeed, they might in fact have precluded the 
finding of the best solution. Such a paradox can lead to a 
paralysis that makes action in the world impossible. 
How does one recover from such a paralysis, perhaps 
brought on by too much knowledge? Faith in God's 
grace makes it possible actually to do what I have 
reasoned I must do in order to promote goodness and 
justice, even though I know that whatever I do will not 
eliminate all injustice in the world; it may even 
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perpetuate some injustice that I did not recognize. 
Moreover, my witness to my faith, my evangelizing of 
the freedom it confers on me, is most true to itself when I 
respect the freedom of others. I am not trying to convert, 
to make little Lutherans of my colleagues or my students. 
I am working in service to God's words of hope for peace 
and justice. I do not condemn my colleagues who do not 
share the particularity of my beliefs; I listen hard to the 
challenges they present to me. I struggle with the ways 
in which I and the institution-both the church and the 
university-fall short of the ideal community, but I try to 
keep before me the gospel, the good news of forgiveness 
and redemption. 
Why worry about our vocation, or calling, to be 
Lutheran colleges and universities? 
Like many church-related universities, Texas Lutheran 
University has struggled to articulate for itself and for 
others what its middle name might mean. What 
motivates this need to situate ourselves? Are we fearful 
of losing students, of not responding to the market, of 
ceasing to exist, of leaving the church, of becoming the 
church? Or is there something good we do that ought not 
to be lost? Are we motivated by fear or by love? 
Since the publication of E. D. Hirsch's Cultural Literacy, 
Allan Bloom's The Closing of the American Mind, and 
William Bennett's Book of Virtues, there have been 
numerous fairly popular critiques of the American 
academy. These books, while at times simplistic in their 
analyses (perhaps precisely because of that simplicity), 
do resonant with an audience beyond what the public 
names the "ivory tower of academia." For that public, 
what we do in the universities remains esoteric, 
theoretical, valueless, and suspect. 
For writers such as Hirsch, we are no longer teaching the 
right things, the things that will provide our students, 
when they are no longer our students, access to the world 
imperialist tools; the complaints go on. Bennett's Book 
of Virtues, which is sold at supermarket checkouts as well 
as in university bookstores, elaborates the Bloomian and 
Hirschite themes by providing a list of virtues that will 
solve our problems if we could just get them back into 
the public arena; that is, teach them to our children.2 
Bennett's work does for K-12 what Bloom's and Hirsch's 
did for colleges and universities. 
My characterization of these pos1t10ns and the 
descriptions about where we have gone wrong and how 
we ought to fix it may be rather hasty and overly 
generalized, but the point is, they think we have gone 
wrong; there are a lot of folk who agree with them. 
Michael Berube and Cary Nelson sum up the situation of 
the 1990s this way: 
The 1990s have not been kind to 
American institutions of higher 
education. Academy-bashing is now 
among the fastest-growing of major U.S. 
industries, and the charges are as 
numerous as the bashers themselves: 
teachers don't teach; scholars fritter 
away their time and your tax dollars on 
studies of music videos; campus 
regulations thwart free speech; the 
Western cultural heritage is besieged by 
tenured radicals; heterosexual white 
men are under attack from feminist, 
multiculturalist, and gay and lesbian 
groups; universities are buying luxury 
yachts with federal research dollars; 
academic standards of all kinds are in 
tatters; undergraduates lack both reading 
skills and moral foundations; and, in the 
midst of all this, to add financial insult 
to intellectual injury, college tuitions are 
skyrocketing. (Berube 1) 
of the culturally elite. For Bloom and his followers, most Berube and Nelson go on to document the shift from 
of us, with the exception of a few enlightened political concern about political correctness in the academy to the 
philosophers, are no longer teaching the right things. We attempt to define what it is that we should be teaching 
are no longer doing so because we have succumbed to there. While Bloom and others lament the type of values 
faddish movements such as Women's Studies, African- taught in the academy, the latest move in the "culture 
American Studies, and Gay and Lesbian Studies, all of wars" is to lament the loss of values in the academy. 
hich have a political agenda beyond the academy. All Berube and Nelson recognize this double movement as 
se intellectual and curricular movements pollute the ironic. They summarize the character of the debates 
·ty of the academic endeavor by the importation of a surrounding higher education as revolving around two 
· /�mted political agenda into what should be a purely contradictory statements: "[Higher education] has 
intellectual endeavor. The syllabus is fragmented; the abandoned its mission by arrogantly seeking to shape 
objectives unclear at best and politically motivated at student's moral and civic lives, and, worse still, it has 
worst; assessment procedures, even the right of abandoned its mission to shape students' moral and civic 
professors to access students, come under attack as lives" (Berube 2). Berube and Nelson claim that while 
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faculty at large universities do inculcate values in their 
students, these values do not correspond to the values 
immediately conducive to the powerful corporate and 
governmental cultures pervasive outside the walls of 
academe. George Marsden, in The Outrageous Idea of 
Christian Scholarship, also notes that neutral and 
objective perspectives on truth, while still touted as 
desired, are routinely shunned in the academy in favor of 
identity-driven perspectives. The point is that even in the 
large research universities value-free education has not 
been available; it's just that the values being taught are 
not the values the secular world seems to require. In this 
respect the large universities and smaller, church-related 
universities resemble each other. For, with some 
exceptions, church-related colleges and universities in the 
Christian tradition claim that gospel-centered values also 
challenge the apparently selfish and self-serving 
principles of the capitalist marketplace and the corporate 
boardroom. 
So, whether we agree with Indiana University's Berube 
and Nelson or George Marsden on all counts, their claims 
that universities are inculcating values in the students 
warrant our close attention. Berube and Nelson's 
additional statistics on class size and teaching loads of 
professors in the liberal arts at public institution should 
also cause us to ponder what truly is the difference 
between Indiana University and places like Texas 
Lutheran University. For, in the admissions propaganda 
from small liberal arts colleges across the United States, 
the claims of small class size and individual attention 
from professors resound. However, if an account of large 
research universities can show that they too can offer 
such things, then where will our niche be? Are we really 
needed? What claims can we make for a unique 
educational experience? What rationale can we produce 
to justify our vocation as a Lutheran institution? 
As a Lutheran institution, we would betray our heritage if 
we were to become a fundamentalist "Bible" college, 
although we might find a significant clientele for such a 
college, especially in some regions of the country. We 
would likewise betray our heritage were we to become a 
generic liberal arts college, more or less like any other in 
the nation. The only option, it seems to me, is to 
establish for ourselves and for the general public what is 
distinctively Lutheran about us and why that distinctively 
Lutheran character is appropriate, perhaps even 
necessary, in the cmTent pluralistic cultural and academic 
climate. Why are we called to be the kinds of institutions 
we are? 
Confusion between the exigencies of the secular and 
the centrality of the sacred 
The modem university, while we think of it as a 
development of the medieval monastic tradition, and 
certainly Lutheran education must trace its roots to this 
tradition, also has significant roots in the agora, the open 
marketplace, of Athens. Jaroslav Pelikan, states: 
"Although the ancestors of the modem university are 
multiple and complex, including as they do the seats of 
learning in many ancient cultures, there is no denying 
that the university has deep roots also in the monastery 
and the church. Indeed, ... the medieval university was 
the foundation of the university as we know it . . . " 
(Pelikan 45). The twentieth century university provides 
both a contemplative place and one connected with the 
public space of the market and politics. Both the retiring, 
private scholar or the scientist who spends hours on end 
in the laboratory, and the public intellectual who views 
him or herself as duty-bound to change society for the 
better, find a conducive home in the academy. Our 
profession has no pre-established borders that define for 
us whether we are engaged more properly in a public, 
shared enterprise with, perhaps, certain responsibilities to 
established authority in the public domain, or whether our 
proper area of concern should be that of individual 
intellectual and ethical development. 
George Marsden' s works, especially The Soul of the 
American University, provide an interesting analysis of 
the role of the American university in training (for the 
marketplace) and educating (with an eye to spiritual 
formation) its future leaders. His emphasis is on higher 
education's public role. He identifies the post-Civil War 
era as the site of a decisive shift in higher education's 
goals. The North, having won the military victory, in 
large part because of its superior technological and 
industrial power, could also claim a moral victory. Moral 
and technological progress were linked; the land-grant 
colleges were set up to initiate students into the practical 
and technological mysteries of modern industrial society; 
and the Eastern establishment universities began to move 
beyond their missions as simply training grounds for the 
clergy. They became the forerunners of the modem 
research university and began the disciplinary 
specialization we take for granted, and sometimes resist. 
Mark Schwehn' s book Exiles in Eden analyzes the 
historical and cultural roots of the currently specialized 
disciplines. He suggests that the American research 
university modeled itself after the German universities 
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and especially after Max Weber's ideas on what properly 
constituted studies at the university. That is, in the 
university academics aimed for "mastery of the world 
through calculation and control" (Schwehn 58). Each 
academic discipline had its appropriate tools with which 
to fashion its understanding of the world. Weber's 
disciplined scholarly activity no longer has as a goal the 
universitas; the education of the whole person is not the 
goal, for questions of ultimate meaning have no place in 
Weber's academy. However, Weber's language imports 
to his severely pruned disciplines the moral discourse of 
the Puritans and provides added impetus for the liberal 
Protestant movement on the American academic scene. 
In the United States, the language that heretofore had 
been used primarily to describe spiritual as well as 
intellectual enlightenment was divorced from the realm 
of the spirit. It applied exclusively to the life of the mind. 
While Marsden identifies the roots of the disassociation 
of religion and the life of the mind in American 
nineteenth-century liberal progressive Protestantism, 
Schwehn contends that this disassociation owes at least 
as much to Weber's two works "Science as a Vocation" 
and The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 
(Marsden 3-21). Weber's call to the German universities 
to pare all ultimate questions from the core of verifiable 
knowledge and the progressive Protestant ethic collude in 
applying the language of faith to the knowledge of the 
world. The results are twofold. First, certain disciplines, 
notably the natural sciences, whose methodologies 
resonate deeply with this call for particular, verifiable, 
and practical knowledge, come to the fore. Second, the 
university, as a locus of knowledge, substitutes for the 
church, as a locus of faith. Instead of faith motivating 
one's life in meaningful ways, knowledge provides a 
justification for action aimed primarily at obtaining 
practical results, verifiable and meaningful in precisely 
the same way to everyone. 
In The Idea of the University: A Reexamination, Jaroslav 
Pelikan recognizes the temptation to treat the university 
in the guise of mother of the soul, as an alma mater: 
Because I have been disappointed so 
often in institutional Christendom and 
because, by contrast, the university has 
Nicene Creed. It is not that; and if we 
act as though it were, we shall send a 
charge through the wires that the wires 
cannot carry, ending in idolatry or 
disaster. (Pelikan 66-67) 
The university culture forms Pelikan's core beliefs as it 
does most academics'. We, like Pelikan, are products of 
a university system that speaks of its mission to educate, 
its moral responsibility to inculcate virtues in its students, 
and its expectation that society's leaders come from its 
halls. Even in the state universities, according to 
Marsden, there is no question that the mission of the 
university or college as an institution of higher learning 
and research is consonant with the nineteenth-century 
liberal progressive mission of Christianity: 
Although self-conscious secularism is a 
significant force in academic 
communities, its strength has been 
vastly amplified by the convergence of 
. . . other forces . . .. Liberal 
Protestantism opposed traditional 
Christian exclusivism and helped rule it 
out of bounds. Methodological 
secularization provided a non­
controversial rationale for such a move, 
reinforced by beliefs concerning the 
universal dictates of science. Concerns 
about pluralism and justice supplied a 
moral rationale. Moreover, to all these 
forces can be added one ... , the widely 
held popular belief, sometimes 
suggested in the courts but not yet 
consistently applied, that government 
funding excludes any religious teaching. 
(Marsden 34) 
Marsden' s point is that the "secularization" of the 
university is a relatively recent phenomenon and, while in 
its beginning stages it was motivated by a Liberal 
Protestant ethic that had gone mostly unchallenged in the 
United States, it was undergirded by a belief in the saving 
power of the modem way of life, as exemplified, 
naturally, by the American experience. 
been for almost half a century the chief After World War II, university scholars begin to 
repository of truth and the community of challenge the modem agenda set by Descartes and 
wisdom to me personally, and is . . . elaborated by the 18th century Enlightenment 
my spiritual mother who has reared and philosophers. Foundationalism, rationalism and 
nourished me, . . . I have sometimes empiricism were themselves identified as biases. 
been in danger of regarding it as the Stephen Toulmin, in his remarkable book Cosmopolis, 
embodiment of the One Holy catholic identifies a double beginning for this modem era. The 
and Apostolic church affirmed in the first modems, argues Toulmin, are the Renaissance men 
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(and women?) of the 16th century. The Renaissance 
humanist tradition of Montaigne, Shakespeare, Erasmus, 
Luther and Rabelais ushers in the modem age. Descartes 
and the others react to that prior pluralistic tradition. 
Toulmin's work suggests, in what is no longer such a 
surprising move, that Descartes' desire for some certain 
ground from which all knowledge would follow, and 
would therefore be equally as certain as its ground, 
derived in no small measure from his historical and 
personal context. In a chaotic world dominated by 
political instability, religious conflict, and seemingly 
endless wars that did little to reestablish order, what 
could be more seductive than a theory or a perspective 
that would enable its holder to reestablish order with its 
application? 
Toulmin argues that Descartes' reductive philosophy 
constitutes a reaction to the humanistic impulse of the 
previous century. He wanted answers for all situations, 
not perspectives based on individual experience that 
might have been different if the experiences had differed. 
Descartes wanted a solid foundation for truth claims. At 
its root, Toulmin suggests, the rationalist project is not 
purely rational; it is embedded in the social and political 
particularities of Europe in the 16th and early 17th 
centuries, and the desire for social, economic, political 
and theological order that continues to be expressed 
through the 20th century. The Enlightenment dream of a 
universal human truth, determined by rational thought 
and divorced from particular contingencies, proves just 
that-a dream. 3 Perhaps it is even a nightmare. 
In the current academic climate, some still cling to the 
Enlightenment's rational dream. Most, however, 
recognize the inadvisability, if not the impossibility, of 
pursuing its ends. However, the privileged 
spokespersons for public political and cultural agenda, 
the polis, and the marketplace, the agora, still call for 
universalizable virtues that we can all agree on no matter 
who we are or where we come from. We need these 
virtues, so the argument goes, in order to "get down to 
business." It is all very well for privileged university 
professors to argue about the contingencies of truth, 
about moral and factual relativism, about the inability to 
ever completely and objectively know something, but the 
rest of America has work to do! Hence, I would suggest, 
the rise of Christian fundamentalism, of biblical 
literalism, and of unthoughtful recourse to authority and a 
tradition (mis)understood as static. The academy, 
naturally (and appropriately), objects. And so should 
Lutherans. 
What the Lutheran University has to offer 
Lutherans should object, and have been objecting albeit 
quietly, since the first Lutheran college opened its doors. 
Our educational system is grounded in that Renaissance 
of the sixteenth century and the advances of the ensuing 
centuries inform it. But at the core of an education in the 
Lutheran tradition are the affirmation of the human being 
in this world, God's creation, and a simultaneous 
affirmation of our essential connection with the kingdom 
of God. Thus, at the core of Lutheran education there is a 
recognized and theologically complex tension between 
the sacred and the secular. In his book Lutheran Higher 
Education, Ernest Simmons asserts that "a sharp line 
between the sacred and the secular cannot be drawn for 
the Lutheran tradition" (33). The public space of politics 
and the marketplace must not be divorced from the 
spiritual and intellectual tradition of the monastery. 
Indeed, scholars at Lutheran-related colleges, 
universities, and seminaries ought to respond to the 
exigencies of the secular without losing sight of the 
centrality of the sacred. "The academic institutions of the 
church, colleges and seminaries, carry special 
responsibility ... as frontier places for the engagement of 
Word and world" (Simmons 29). It is our responsibility 
to put the sacred and the secular in conversation with one 
another. 
In Models for Christian Higher Education, Richard 
Hughes identifies as distinctive the Lutheran affirmation 
of human being. We delight in our humanity even as we 
recognize that humans are not perfect. While we are in 
the world (and we love it, for it is God's creation and a 
gift), we understand our world to be limited and are 
inspired by what is beyond this world. This inspiration of 
the kingdom of God helps us to critically assess the 
created world that we so enjoy and to recognize its 
imperfections along with its joys. 
The Lutheran tradition delights in discovery and 
exploration of this world, even as those discoveries might 
lead us to despair of the human propensity for destruction 
and other evils. These discoveries may also sow doubt 
and can lead to the loss of faith. On the other hand, such 
doubt can also lead to a greater awareness of God's 
infinite grace and a subsequent strengthening of faith. 
Because we live in this world, there are, however, no 
guarantees that we will experience the latter 
strengthening rather than the former loss. This 
uncertainty is a mark of our humanity. If we never risk 
the loss of faith, we risk intellectual and spiritual 
stagnation; we betray our God-given nature. 
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Born out of the monastic university tradition, the 
Lutheran faith tradition is one grounded in the search for 
knowledge and the understanding of how best to use that 
knowledge to serve our neighbor and honor our gracious 
God. Our mission in the universities is to continue to 
serve the church and to make knowledge accessible to 
all-not just to a privileged few who read the required 
language. We educate in the language of the people, for 
Luther believed God's truth should be available to all in a 
language they could understand. Hence, all should learn 
to read and God's word should be translated from Latin 
into German and other vernaculars. Our universities 
participate in this on-going mission to educate. Not all 
our students will be Christians (the privileged class in our 
contemporary American setting), but all should have 
access to knowledge. Without knowledge, how can one 
take care of and participate well in God's created world? 
As Lutheran tradition resists an easy separation of the 
sacred from the secular, so it resists the collapse of the 
two. The tension between God's kingdom and this world 
remains unresolved. This lack of resolution makes 
possible continued dialogue. We do not have all the 
answers, but we have God's assurance that not having all 
the answers, living with paradoxes, ambiguities, and 
pluralism is part of what it means to be human. Our job is 
to use the gifts from God in order to do the best job 
possible here and now, in this world. Just as our 
relationship with God is unmediated by any human 
authority, just as that relationship with Christ is an 
individual responsibility sustained by and within the 
context of a faith community, so our relationship with 
knowledge must be an individual responsibility. The 
primary community in which that relationship to 
knowledge is developed and sustained is the academic 
community. The Lutheran universities, and one hopes 
the Lutheran church and its congregations, recognize the 
ways in which our faith in God and our knowledge of the 
world are intricately linked. In an age as uncertain and as 
violent as Descartes' century, will we succumb to 
temptation and attempt easy resolutions? Will we give in 
to the demands of political correctness of whatever ilk or 
to market pressures? If we do so, we betray our Lutheran 
tradition that calls us to live in the fallen human world 
that is nevertheless a gift from God and to be enjoyed and 
sustained. We must respond to God's redeeming grace 
by leading lives "of grace-filled freedom and loving 
service, or joyful hope and commitment" (Simmons 26). 
colleges?" Some church-related colleges and universities 
respond to this question by bracketing it: The others do 
not belong to this community; non-Christians need not 
apply. If there are no others to include, the question of 
inclusivity is moot. This attitude betrays the insights of 
the modem era; it also betrays Luther's understanding of 
the two kingdoms and his call to us to ask difficult 
questions. "[T]he Christian is called to make common 
cause with all people, including those of other faiths, in 
providing for a just and healthy world" (Simmons 27). 
Currently, spiritual and moral education are affirmed 
"add-ons'; to the primary academic mission of the 
university, even at institutions that have a close relation 
with their church bodies.4 Many of the ELCA colleges 
and universities would fall, or almost fall, into this 
description. The spiritual is relegated to the realm of the 
extra-curricular and housed in campus ministry and the 
Fellowship of Christian Athletes and some other student 
groups whose spiritual lives are fulfilled through 
participation in these extra-curricular activities. When 
we are teaching in the liberal arts university and our goal 
is integrated knowledge and development of the whole 
person, then the add-on approach is inappropriate. To 
eliminate my Lutheran Christian perspective from my 
teaching amounts to an intellectual and spiritual 
dishonesty that should not be tolerated. Any attempt to 
excise reference to Christian (or any other) particularity 
from our classrooms, our offices, or our scholarship does 
a disservice to our colleagues and ourselves. 
Alisdair MacIntyre suggests that the university is the site 
of "constrained disagreement." In order to participate in 
this constrained disagreement, students deserve to have 
as many avenues to truth as possible opened to them. 
Likewise, colleagues can only effectively engage each 
other's ideas if those ideas are shared in good faith. 
Since we live in the tension between God's created world 
and God's divine kingdom, if we neglect one or the other, 
we are liable to arrest the dialogue not only between the 
two kingdoms, but also between teacher and student and 
among colleagues. 
Putting the Christian agenda on the academic table is 
risky. To engage in discussion in good faith, one must be 
willing to listen well to the other side. Nicholas 
Wolterstorff says poignantly, 
Practical considerations for the future Whereas for a long time now it has been 
the calling of the Christian scholar to 
Obviously, in a society as pluralistic as ours, we must ask emphasize that Christianity offers a 
ourselves, "How can we make our universities open to distinctive perspective on reality, the 
others and still maintain our uniqueness as Lutheran time may be coming when it will be at 
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least as important to emphasize our 
shared humanity and the importance of 
mutual listening. If what emerges from 
the overthrow of the hegemony of 
Eurocentric bourgeois white males is not 
speaking and listening in dialogue but 
hard-of-hearing multiple power 
constellations, then nothing has been 
gained. (W olterstorff 26) 
We cannot take this caution too seriously, and we must 
realize that in entering the conversation, we agree to 
listen as part of our responsible participation. Indeed, our 
Christianity itself mandates this listening. 
A theology of the cross requires us to be loving members 
of the community; it requires us to listen to those who are 
marginalized by, because, of, or in spite of the 
community. In such listening, we embody the 
faithfulness to God's love that Jesus embodied when he 
listened to the Galilean woman, when he spoke with the 
Samaritan woman at the well, when he affirmed the 
listening woman, Mary. At all these times, he rebuked 
his disciples for a too narrow interpretation of his 
mission; he rebuked them for their reliance on the law 
which he scandalously transgressed. Christ is the 
embodiment of transgression that mitigates all human 
transgressions. We cannot mitigate transgression; only 
God can. Likewise, we cannot know with certainty what 
does not transgress, what is right under the law; what is 
true in the Richard Rorty' s sense of truth. 5 
In the world of empirical proofs and inductive reasoning, 
we cannot get to God. However, God's resistance to 
rational thought (or vice versa) does not mean that it is 
unreasonable to believe in God or to believe in a 
particular self-revelation of God's self. In my case, I do 
believe in God. I experience God's presence in my life. 
I cannot prove that God touches my life; but no one can 
prove that God does not do so. Now having said that 
God is present in my life, let me also say that there are 
many times when I doubt whether I should believe. 
Some would claim that this doubt disqualifies me from 
claiming belief. I am, however, reassured by doubting 
Thomas-just the last instance of a disciple having to be 
shown that Christ's truth exceeds a limited legalistic 
understanding of the truth-and by my belief in God's 
abiding love for me; even when I doubt, God remains. 
Thus, here I am back in the web of my belief. 
Wolterstorff affirms that entanglement, as do I, as an 
appropriate perspective from which to engage in both 
research and teaching. It is an entanglement informed by 
both faith and doubt. I doubt that I, or anyone else who 
claims to, have the whole truth, the answer, the right that 
ends all wrongs, but I might and s/he might. 
In our teaching, in our collegial relationships, etc., we 
must therefore listen to the narratives of others, including 
those outside the Christian, outside the Lutheran 
tradition. Those traditions, as we articulate them in 
human languages, constitute the law. We respect the 
authority of the law, but live in the light of the gospel. 
All human institutions will fall short of the mark. In 
choosing to work within the Lutheran tradition, we 
recognize that both institutions and individuals fall short 
of the mark for which we aim. This is harmatia, which is 
translated in the Bible as sin and in Aristotle's 
Nicomachean Ethics as missing the mark ( of virtue). 
Recognizing that we all miss the mark of truth or virtue 
or justice does not excuse any of us from continuing to 
try to hit that mark. Trying to hit that mark constitutes 
our faithfulness to God's self-revelation in Christ Jesus. 
The recognition that we will miss the mark sows in us 
humility or at least it ought to. 
Pedagogical and theological dialogues 
I am faced with proclaiming my Lutheranness within the 
context of a Lutheran institution. It is the privileged 
position. I cannot claim that my voiced perspective is 
equal among the many I know are represented at our 
universities. In addition, a Christian perspective has 
been, and in some circles continues to be, associated with 
Eurocentric imperialism, patriarchy, racism, etc. It has 
sustained many bad things. Now, I claim that the 
Lutheran tradition has something good and vital to teach 
me and my colleagues who choose to work in institutions 
affiliated with the Lutheran tradition. I can make this 
claim because of the intellectual complexity of Lutheran 
theology and its insistence on dialogue. 
In Exiles from Eden, Schwehn suggests we reformulate 
our goals so that we recognize our quest as a communal 
one for integrated understanding, not an individual one 
for isolated certainty: 
Instead of Weberian mastery of the 
world through calculation and control, 
academics ought primarily to seek 
understanding of the world through 
communal inquiry. This latter endeavor 
follows quite naturally from the 
affections of awe, wonder, and gratitude 
that together constitute piety. Finally, 
the means-end rationality that defined 
the academic mind for Weber must be 
absorbed into a far more capacious 
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epistemology that views qualities of 
character, mind and spirit as integrally 
related to one another. (Schwehn 58) 
Likewise, a few years ago, Richard Hughes reminded the 
Lutheran college and university presidents that Lutheran 
theology insists on human finitude. Because of this 
insistence, "Lutherans can never absolutize their own 
perspectives, even their theological perspectives" 
(Hughes 6). In academe, our perspectives are determined 
not only by the particularities of history, but also by our 
training and disciplinary interests. If we are to remain 
true to the Lutheran tradition, these disciplinary 
perspectives can never be absolutized. Since the 
practitioners in each discipline participate in the quest for 
understanding, we must remain in dialogue with each 
other, not isolated in self-referential and self­
congratulatory niches of truth. 
In the classroom, we must demonstrate an approach to 
knowledge that eschews any rigid adherence to a set of 
preestablished methodologies. As educators in a 
Lutheran university environment, we are called to 
interdisciplinary approaches, recognizing the limiting and 
limited nature of a single discipline's approach to and 
effect on the truth. In addition, within our disciplines we 
are called to take advantage of multiple approaches and 
to continue to modify our approach to the subject matter 
proper to the discipline itself. 
There is no such thing as a neutral perspective. All truth 
claims are founded on some perspectival assumption. 
Even the claim that there is a truth devoid of particularity 
can only make sense in the context of a system that 
desires a universal, generically human truth; i.e., a truth 
that is true for all human beings at all times and in all 
places. This was the project of the Enlightenment. It has 
failed, but we should not, therefore, turn to nihilism. 
As a teacher, I must be aware of the power and authority 
I have, justified only by my position and preparation (not 
by God's grace). Even though I know that I might be 
wrong, my students will not know that; in some cases, 
they will not want to know that. My work is similar to 
that of any pastor. I am not a priest who mediates 
between her students and the truth. I do not hold the keys 
He did not set himself up as the authority who could 
teach others the right way to truth; he gave them the 
means to teach themselves. He did not condemn them for 
their ignorance, but facilitated their understanding. He 
gave them the means by which they could take personal 
responsibility for their relationship to God. We must 
provide the means to facilitate such relationships for our 
students in regards to truth and knowledge as well as to 
God. This is the Lutheran "priesthood of all believers" 
implemented in the classroom. 
Finally, the Lutheran church is a reforming church. It has 
not been reformed (past perfect), but is reforming 
(present progressive). As a member of the church at one 
of its universities, I investigate possible areas of reform. 
I am responsible for communicating to the church the 
view from the outside and modeling for the church how 
to engage in conversation with those outside the tradition. 
I may not do it very well, but I keep trying. Jesus is my 
model. He spoke to the woman at the well-unclean, 
adulteress, unbeliever, a person unacceptable under the 
law of Jesus' tradition. It was she to whom he first 
revealed himself. I must listen to those outside the 
tradition because God's work is not done just by people 
of the tradition. In fact, the lure of worldly wisdom can 
be so strong that sometimes little of God's work can be 
done; God's words are not heard; God's love is not 
experienced when we allow the constraining laws of the 
created world to override the Gospel of good news and 
loving kindness and God's infinite grace. 
This Lutheran understanding of ongoing reformation is 
essential to my teaching. Recognizing that my education 
(in French, my formation) is not past, nor perfect, I am 
freed from the need to be a perfect teacher, always right 
and in control at all times. I freely recognize my own 
fallibility and am thereby freed to listen to students' 
perspectives. I am freed to try new pedagogical 
approaches. And, most importantly, I am freed to 
critique myself and hear the criticisms of others, without 
those criticisms destroying me or my teaching. 
Essentially, I am freed from hegemonic claims by the one 
claim of Christ, and once again affirm the paradoxical 
situation of being in the world and simultaneously of the 
kingdom of God. 
..... to the Kingdom; Christ does, my students do. In Those of my colleagues who are not Christian and those 
eological terms, our students have as much access to who are Christian and not Lutheran and who work 
hrist, Truth, and knowledge as we do. We need to show alongside Lutherans in the Lutheran universities and 
m that they do have this access, remind them of it in colleges do so because in large measure they share the 
C,•\ Platonic sense. Our situation is similar to Luther's. concern for justice and for the non-judgmental search for 
}Yhen he traveled to country congregations, he was truth. This concern, however, is neither exclusively 
appalled by their lack of knowledge about the basic tenets Christian nor perhaps even particularly Lutheran. Many 
of Christianity. The result: Luther's Small Catechism. of them would claim, like me, that they engage in action 
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for the sake of love and justice for our neighbors. It is 
this commitment to non-judgmental understanding that 
promotes action for the sake of love and justice that 
unites us. It is we who embody both individually and 
collectively the Lutheran tradition. And, as with all 
embodiments, except the one in Christ, we fall short of 
the virtuous marks at which we aim. We sin. However, 
we live in the world in which the one perfect incarnation 
of truth was made possible through God's 
incomprehensible, infinite graciousness. This incarnation 
of truth simultaneously embodies the transgression of the 
law and continues to inspire, motivate and justify our 
imperfect aspiring embodiments of God's truth in the 
world. 
Wendy Mccredie is the associate director for interpretation in the Department for Communication at the ELGA 
churchwide office in Chicago. 
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Notes 
1 I have chosen this term primarily because "dialectic" has, unfortunately, come to have connotations of conflict that must be resolved 
through the sublation of one argument into another more comprehensive logic. "Dialogic," on the other hand, retains the sense of 
simultaneously unresolved and motivating logical movements. See Mikhail Bakhtin's The Dialogic Imagination. 
2 Two centuries ago, Benjamin Franklin also enumerated the virtues necessary for good living. His Autobiography, however, ironizes 
an unthoughtful, blinkered approach to virtues and demonstrates that one virtue may contradict another. 
3 See Richard Rorty' s Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity for an elaboration on the contingency of truth. 
4 Michael Beaty, "Perspectivalism and its Cultured Despisers," Baylor University, 15 July 1996, given as part of the Lilly Fellows 
Summer Seminar. 
5 "Truth is a property of linguistic entities, of sentences." Contingency, p. 7. 
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